Quick WestLaw Tip: Use the Digest and Synopsis Field Restrictions to Quickly Find Points of Law

Hello everyone,

A few people have been coming up to me with Westlaw questions, so I thought I’d put up a real helpful and easy way to find cases for points of law you need quickly.

WestLaw has several field restrictions that can help you narrow your search.  The one I’m going to show you is the Digest field restriction, or DI(x), where DI stands for Digest, and “x” stands for the key words you’ll type in.

For example, if you want to find cases that contain points of law referring to the Federal Tort Claims Act’s Discretionary Function exception you might type in this:

DI(FTCA “Federal Tort Claims Act” /p “discretionary function”)

Or, maybe find something on equitable servitudes:

DI(“equitable servitudes”)

Now, we’ll turn to the Synopsis field restriction.  The Synopsis portion of the case is a quick summary of the case that you see at the beginning of every case you pull up on WestLaw.  So, let’s combine Synopsis and Digest field restrictions to find cases even quicker.  The Synopsis field restriction is encoded as SY(x)

Let’s say you want to find cases involving automobile accidents and the negligence element of foreseeability.  To link field restrictions together in the same search use the ampersand character (“&”).

So, for example, you might enter:

SY(auto! vehicle car truck motor! /p crash accident collision collide) & DI(negligence /p foreseeability foreseeable)

Try this out and let me know if it works, or if you have any questions.

Tools for Better Legal Writing

If only I wasn’t so hasty in wanting to spend my Barnes and Noble gift certificate, I might have waited a little to buy one of the following books (recommended by the Legal Writing Prof Blog):

Thinking Like a Writer: A Lawyer’s Guide to Effective Writing and Editing, by Stephen V. Armstrong and Timothy P. Terrell.

The Winning Brief: 100 Tips for Persuasive Briefing in Trial and Appellate Court, by Bryan Garner.

Style: Ten Lessons in Clarity and Grace, by Joseph M. Williams (not specifically legal related) (Note: 9th ed. is now available with different title: Style: Lessons in Clarity and Grace, by same author).

Legal Writing in Plain English: A Text with Exercises, by Bryan Garner

Legal Writing: Getting it Right and Getting it Written, by Mary Barnard Ray and Jill J. Ramsfield

Anything by Bryan Garner.

I already own Legal Writing in Plain English, and it’s an awesome book.  My girlfriend has The Winning Brief and The Red Book, both written by Bryan Garner, and I’ve been meaning to get my hands on them for quite some time.

After working for roughly a year with the U.S. Attorneys office I’ve picked up my own habits that I like to inject into every memorandum I write:

1. Figure out which jurisdictional attack your boss is planning and incorporate some of the standards into your writing.  For example, the majority of my work goes into P&A’s for Summary Judgment, so I always begin with a quick blurb on the standards of summary judgment, and what is necessary for our side to prove (depending if we’re the moving or non-moving party) given the context of the case.
2. Always give a general background of the area of law you’re discussing before developing specific cases with your client’s facts.  For example, if you’re writing up a memo on medical malpractice, two or three sentences discussing the general elements of a med mal cause of action wouldn’t hurt.  Most times your boss is too busy with so many different cases, and might need the general outline of the law to re-orient himself (or herself) so he (or she) can focus on this case.
3. Somewhere in the conclusion, or as the conclusion itself, argue to the judge reading your arguments about why a ruling for your side is fair.  Judges are just as concerned with law, facts and evidence as you are; however, they shoulder the burden of equity, and making sure that the law is applied in a manner that will produce justice.

That’s all I can think of right now, but if I think of more I’ll post them.  Any suggestions of your own?

New Indian Law Blog

So, I’ve published so much stuff on Indian law I’ve decided to branch it off and start my own Indian law blog: http://ahwahnee.wordpress.com/

All the Indian law articles that were published here will remain here, but from here on out all new Indian law stuff will appear at the California Indian Law Blog.

Enjoy!

Rare (and Published) Ninth Circuit Decision on Tribal Disenrollment

It’s not every day you see the Ninth Circuit hand down an Indian law decision, let alone one dealing with tribal disenrollment.  This blog’s particular attention to tribal disenrollment is well documented, so when I see a new case talking about this subject I am all over it.

The case in question is Jeffredo v. Macarro, — F.3d —, 2009 WL 4912143 (9^th Cir. 2009).  (To read the full opinion, see: http://blogs.findlaw.com/ninth_circuit/2009/12/jeffredo-v-macarro-no-08-55037.html)

For a full analysis, click here; below is a summary of the decision.

The Facts

The Appellants, several members of the Pechanga Band of the Luiseno Mission Indians (“Pechanga Tribe”), were disenrolled for failing to prove their lineal descent as members of the Tribe.  Pursuant to the Pechanga Tribe’s constitution and bylaws, the Enrollment Committee investigated the Appellants because they “received information from its members alleging [the Appellants] were not lineal descendents from the original Pechanga Temecula people.”  Jeffredo at *1.  The Appellants were disenrolled after they failed to make the necessary showing that they were descended from a particular Indian ancestor and were disenrolled on March 16, 2006.  Id. at *2-3.  The Appellants exercised their right to appeal the decision to the Tribal Council; however, they affirmed the Enrollment Committee’s decision.  Id. at *3.  As a result of their disenrollment, the Appellants were denied access to the tribe’s Senior Citizens’ Center, health clinic, and their children could no longer attend the tribe’s school.  Id. at *4.

Procedural Facts

The Appellants obtained counsel (no lawyers are permitted to represent tribal members during disenrollment proceedings according to the Pechanga Tribe’s constitution).  Appellants’ counsel filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under the Indian Civil Rights Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1301 – 1303 (“ICRA”).  Id. at *3.  The Appellants’ theory of recovery was that “their disenrollment by members of the [Tribal Council] was tantamount to unlawful detention.”  Id. at *1.  Specifically, the Appellants argued that “(1) the [effect of the disenrollment’s] actual restraints, (2) the [effect of the disenrollment’s] potential restraints, and (3) their lost Pechanga identity all amount to detention under [the Indian Civil Rights Act].”  Id. at *4.  Also, the Appellants argued that disenrollment was the same as banishment, and that this was analogous to unlawful detention.  Id. at *6.

The Jeffredo Rule Set

The Ninth Circuit has laid out a rule set to determine whether or not a District Court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear a disenrolled Indian’s petition for writ of habeas corpus under ICRA:

1. The disenrolled petitioner must be in custody; AND
2. The disenrolled petitioner must first exhaust tribal remedies; AND
3. The disenrollment proceedings must be criminal and not civil.

A failure to meet any requirement deprives a court of subject matter jurisdiction.  See Id. at *4.  With these rules in mind, the Ninth Circuit proceeds to affirm the Appellants’ disenrollment.

Discussion

Before analyzing the facts of the Appellants’ case, the Ninth Circuit covered a basic principle of Indian law.  It cited Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978), and Cherokee Intermarriage Cases, 203 U.S. 706 (1906), in stating that “[a] tribe’s rights to define its own membership for tribal purposes has long been recognized as central to its existence as an independent political community.”  Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 72 n.32.

The Ninth Circuit ruled that disenrollment is not considered custody under the Indian Civil Rights Act.  The Appellants’ disenrollment was not actual custody because being denied access to certain tribal facilities was not severe enough.  The Appellants’ disenrollments were also not considered custody because the disenrollment’s potential threat of future detainment was neither severe nor immediate enough.  The most interesting and creative argument that the Appellants’ counsel made was that the loss of tribal identity itself was severe enough to constitute as detention under ICRA.

While the Court had “the most sympathy,” for the reality that disenrolling Appellants effectively terminated their political existence as Native Americans, there was no “precedent for the proposition that disenrollment alone is sufficient to be considered detention under [the Indian Civil Rights Act.]”  Id.  Santa Clara Pueblo’s precedent cannot be ignored by courts in order to give federal courts jurisdiction to hear disenrollment proceedings, nor can the Court expand the “scope of the writ of habeas corpus to cover the exact same subject matter.”  Jeffredo. at *5-6.  The legislative history behind the Indian Civil Rights Act’s habeas remedy does not support the granting of subject matter jurisdiction to federal courts to review disenrollment proceedings.  Id. at *6.

Also, the Appellants’ failed to exhaust their remedies with regards to their claim that disenrollment constituted banishment, and thus making the argument that disenrollment was equivalent to custody.  Because of the Appellants’ failure to bring this claim at the tribal level, the Ninth Circuit declined to analyze this issue.  The dissent noted that this conclusion was in error because the Appellants were “not asserting jurisdiction based on any exclusion or eviction from the Pechanga Reservation[, but rather], Appellants’ claim of jurisdiction . . . based on the restraints on their liberty arising from being disenrolled and threatened with exclusion.”  Id. at * 12.

The Ninth Circuit also ruled that disenrollment proceedings were not criminal in nature, but were civil and therefore, the Appellants’ failed to establish the third prong of the rule set outlined at the beginning of the case.  The Court felt that a broad interpretation of the ICRA habeas remedy would be “inconsistent with the principle of broad, unreviewable tribal sovereignty in all but criminal cases involving physical detention.”  Id. at *7.  Furthermore, courts give great deference to tribes concerning matters of enrollment and tribal membership because of “the often vast gulf between tribal traditions and those with which federal courts are more intimately familiar,” and that “the judiciary should not rush to create causes of action that would intrude on these delicate matters.”  Id. (citing Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 72 n.32).

Based on the above holding, the Appellants’ disenrollment was affirmed.

Now What?

As the Original Pechanga Blog notes: “The group can seek to have Tuesday’s decision re-heard by a larger group of 9th Circuit judges.  They can ultimately appeal the case to the U.S. Supreme Court.”  Off hand, I don’t know how successful appellants are in being granted a full en banc hearing, or whether the cost of bringing a lawsuit further into appellate court would discourage such petitions, but this could be an option.  As for the Supreme Court, I have a good feeling the Roberts-lead SCOTUS will flush this case either through denying certiorari or affirming the Ninth Circuit without comment.  Granting cert wouldn’t inspire me with much hope either since a published decision would reinforce already stagnant (and inherently racist) law, but would extend such law into the area of disenrollment.

All in all, the Ninth Circuit’s ruling is not very surprising other than it being published.  Is it fair?  No.  Not in the slightest.  As the dissent points out, Pechanga’s disenrollment procedures were never used on a large scale “until recently, when the Tribe’s casino profits became a major source of revenue,” and “every adult Pechangan received a per capita benefit of over $250,000 per year.”  Jeffredo, — F.3d —, *8 & *8 n.1 (Wilken, J., dissenting).  What the Jeffredo decision illustrates is the clear lack of any Indian’s Constitutional rights to procedural due process in the United States.  Indians are Americans too, and all Americans have basic rights to life, liberty and property.  What could be more detrimental to an Indians’ liberty interest than their loss of tribal identity?  No court of law can ever grant a good decision to a disenrolled Indian so long as they follow Santa Clara Pueblo’s precedent that Indian membership can only be handled by Indians only.

The dissent makes the clear analogy between disenrollment and denaturalization, and using denaturalization as a form of punishment is:

[M]ore primitive than torture, for it destroys for the individual the political existence that was centuries in the development.  . . .  This punishment is offensive to cardinal principles for which the Constitution stands.  It subjects the individual to a fate of ever-increasing fear and distress.  He knows not what discriminations may be established against him, what proscriptions may be directed against him, and when and for what cause his existence in his native land may be terminated.  He may be subject to banishment, a fate universally decried by civilized people[.]  It is no answer to suggest that all the disastrous consequences of this fate may not be brought to bear on a stateless person.  The threat makes the punishment obnoxious.

While the Court had “the most sympathy,” for the reality that disenrolling Appellants
effectively terminated their political existence as Native Americans, there was no
“precedent for the proposition that disenrollment alone is sufficient to be considered
detention under [the Indian Civil Rights Act.]” Id. Santa Clara Pueblo’s precedent
cannot be ignored by courts in order to give federal courts jurisdiction to hear
disenrollment proceedings, nor can the Court expand the “scope of the writ of habeas
corpus to cover the exact same subject matter.” Jeffredo. at *5-6. The legislative history
behind the Indian Civil Rights Act’s habeas remedy does not support the granting of
subject matter jurisdiction to federal courts to review disenrollment proceedings. Id. at
*6.

Would you take John Yoo’s Con Law Class? (I Would)

Fresh from the midterm fire!  Not sure how well I did – especially on my evidence midterm.  God, that was an evil exam.  Not even my dreaded con law midterm, which should have scared the living daylights out of me, did not make me crumble into a fine hot mess as much as evidence did.

Oh, yeah, Volokh put something up about John Yoo co-teaching a class (“Constitutional Design and the California Constitution”) at his current university (Berkeley, if you can believe it).  Of course, Berkeley students are protesting it.  Why wouldn’t they?

To hear any legal insight from this man would be an awesome opportunity, and as the blog post notes, 23 out of 24 seats have already been filled.  While I don’t agree with the conclusions Yoo reached in his infamous memo (domestic use of military for anti-terrorism purposes OK – no 4th amendment warrants or probable cause needed!), I would still take a few hours out of my day to hear the man elucidate on Constitutional Law.

Top 10 Movies of All Time (or at least mine, anyway)

Ok, so this is highly subjective but to hell with it, I’ll put it up anyway.  I love movies and since I would rather be watching them rather than taking a break from studying to write this post, I thought I would do the next best thing and figure out which movies are truly my favorite as opposed to the thousands that I just “like.”

10 – Blood Diamond

9 – Braveheart

8 – The Mist

7 – The Outlaw Josey Wales

6 – Spiderman 2

5 – The Patriot

4 – The Lord of the Rings Trilogy

3 – Dawn of the Dead (the Romero original)

2 – Miracle at St. Anna

1- Kingdom of Heaven

As you can see I’m into “heavy” movies, lots of drama, lots of action, lots of depth, and lots of emotion.  You will find no romantic comedies on this list because, frankly, they’re a dime a dozen and highly predictable.  Two horror movies made it into the list because they’re well-done movies and not the standard horror fare that is being churned out by Hollywood that sells itself on quick scares and startling moments.

Another post on a National Bar Exam

Adjunct Law Prof highlighted another good piece about the idea of having a national bar exam rather than each state having their own.

Quote:

Advocates of a uniform bar exam say that the advantages would benefit both attorneys who would be able to more easily between jurisdictions as well as consumers who could see their legal bills drop.

Just today, I was having lunch with someone who asked me about the bar, and I said I thought it would be cool if we had a national bar exam.  “Yeah,” he said, “But isn’t the law different for every state?”

To which I replied, “Not really.  The law is similar in a lot of places; however, each state may have a particular nuance on an issue that other states won’t have.”  (Locality Rule v. Same or Similar within Profession for med mal standard of care, for example.)  “I mean, if I go from California to Washington I would have to become familiar with Washington law but that’s why other lawyers and legal scholars write treatises to get you up to speed.  Plus, you can always hire law clerks to help bring you up to speed too.”

And really, without written treatises or additional staff to research the differences for you, you can always do it yourself with Westlaw.

National Archives Puts Out “100 Milestone Documents” List

http://www.ourdocuments.gov/content.php?page=milestone

The NARA has put out a 100 Milestone Documents list; and it is a very interesting read.

Here’s the list:

• Lee Resolution (1776)
• Declaration of Independence (1776)
• Articles of Confederation (1777)
• Treaty of Alliance with France (1778)
• Original Design of the Great Seal of the United States (1782)
• Treaty of Paris (1783)
• Virginia Plan (1787)
• Northwest Ordinance (1787)
• Constitution of the United States (1787)
• Federalist Papers, No. 10 & No. 51 (1787-1788)
• President George Washington’s First Inaugural Speech (1789)
• Federal Judiciary Act (1789)
• Bill of Rights (1791)
• Patent for Cotton Gin (1794)
• President George Washington’s Farewell Address (1796)
• Alien and Sedition Acts (1798)
• Jefferson’s Secret Message to Congress Regarding the Lewis & Clark Expedition (1803)
• Louisiana Purchase Treaty (1803)
• Marbury v. Madison (1803)
• Treaty of Ghent (1814)
• McCulloch v. Maryland (1819)
• Missouri Compromise (1820)
• Monroe Doctrine (1823)
• Gibbons v. Ogden (1824)
• President Andrew Jackson’s Message to Congress ‘On Indian Removal’ (1830)
• Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (1848)
• Compromise of 1850 (1850)
• Kansas-Nebraska Act (1854)
• Dred Scott v. Sanford (1857)
• Telegram Announcing the Surrender of Fort Sumter (1861)
• Homestead Act (1862)
• Pacific Railway Act (1862)
• Morrill Act (1862)
• Emancipation Proclamation (1863)
• War Department General Order 143: Creation of the U.S. Colored Troops (1863)
• Gettysburg Address (1863)
• Wade-Davis Bill (1864)
• President Abraham Lincoln’s Second Inaugural Address (1865)
• Articles of Agreement Relating to the Surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia (1865)
• 13th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: Abolition of Slavery (1865)
• Check for the Purchase of Alaska (1868)
• Treaty of Fort Laramie (1868)
• 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: Civil Rights (1868)
• 15th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: Voting Rights (1870)
• Act Establishing Yellowstone National Park (1872)
• Thomas Edison’s Patent Application for the Light Bulb (1880)
• Chinese Exclusion Act (1882)
• Pendleton Act (1883)
• Interstate Commerce Act (1887)
• Dawes Act (1887)
• Sherman Anti-Trust Act (1890)
• Plessy v. Ferguson (1896)
• De Lôme Letter (1898)
• Joint Resolution to Provide for Annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States (1898)
• Platt Amendment (1903)
• Theodore Roosevelt’s Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine (1905)
• 16th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: Federal Income Tax (1913)
• 17th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: Direct Election of U.S. Senators (1913)
• Keating-Owen Child Labor Act of 1916 (1916)
• Zimmermann Telegram (1917)
• Joint Address to Congress Leading to a Declaration of War Against Germany (1917)
• President Woodrow Wilson’s 14 Points (1918)
• 19th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: Women’s Right to Vote (1920)
• Boulder Canyon Project Act (1928)
• Tennessee Valley Authority Act (1933)
• National Industrial Recovery Act (1933)
• National Labor Relations Act (1935)
• Social Security Act (1935)
• President Franklin Roosevelt’s Radio Address unveiling the second half of the New Deal (1936)
• President Franklin Roosevelt’s Annual Message (Four Freedoms) to Congress (1941)
• Lend-Lease Act (1941)
• Executive Order 8802: Prohibition of Discrimination in the Defense Industry (1941)
• Joint Address to Congress Leading to a Declaration of War Against Japan (1941)
• Executive Order 9066: Resulting in the Relocation of Japanese (1942)
• General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Order of the Day (1944)
• Servicemen’s Readjustment Act (1944)
• Manhattan Project Notebook (1945)
• Surrender of Germany (1945)
• United Nations Charter (1945)
• Surrender of Japan (1945)
• Truman Doctrine (1947)
• Marshall Plan (1948)
• Press Release Announcing U.S. Recognition of Israel (1948)
• Executive Order 9981: Desegregation of the Armed Forces (1948)
• Armistice Agreement for the Restoration of the South Korean State (1953)
• Senate Resolution 301: Censure of Senator Joseph McCarthy (1954)
• Brown v. Board of Education (1954)
• National Interstate and Defense Highways Act (1956)
• Executive Order 10730: Desegregation of Central High School (1957)
• President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Farewell Address (1961)
• President John F. Kennedy’s Inaugural Address (1961)
• Executive Order 10924: Establishment of the Peace Corps. (1961)
• Transcript of John Glenn’s Official Communication with the Command Center (1962)
• Aerial Photograph of Missiles in Cuba (1962)
• Test Ban Treaty (1963)
• Official Program for the March on Washington (1963)
• Civil Rights Act (1964)
• Tonkin Gulf Resolution (1964)
• Social Security Act Amendments (1965)
• Voting Rights Act (1965)

A National Bar Exam? (And Other Stuff)

A National Bar Exam?

I was perusing my usual list of reading in Google Reader today and came across this interesting bit: a national bar exam, whereupon successful completion, a newly minted Esquire may be certified to practice law in any state he chooses.  Naturally, a lot of law students like this idea despite the fact that many, including myself, consider the Bar exam and most standardized testing an anachronistic waste of time and money.  (Hat Tip: Best Practices for Legal Education Blog, One BAR to rule them all…)  Here’s a quote for ye:

The time to act is now, [Erica Moeser, president of the National Conference of Bar Examiners, says].  She mentions globalization in the profession, as well as a terrible job market that leaves many students unable to tell what state they’ll be working in when it’s time to sign up for bar exams and prep courses.

I highlighted the relevant language because this ought to be a prime, motivating factor for such an initiative.  I think we have all heard the horror stories about deferred first year associates and massive lay offs.  A national bar exam seems like a good idea.  If one job market looks like crap and you think you might have better odds in the neighboring state, then why not try it out?  It’d be nice if there were no obstacles in your way, like some other state’s exam which will probably cost you some dough at a time when you’re still trying to pay off your student debts (including thousands of dollars of debt incurred for taking bar prep and paying for the bar itself).

Unless God Himself intervenes, however, I (cynically) predict that things will stay exactly the same for some time.  The reason I think this is because state bar examiners still cling to the belief that a licensing exam is the best way to determine who deserves to be a capable attorney.  Also, states like California would not be apt to pick up on a national bar exam because California is a vast maze of legal nuance, thereby ingraining bar examiners into the mindset that a localized bar is better to prepare a would-be attorney for California practice, than a national bar that would not be customized to California’s  particular legal market.  To that I say: Big Deal.  There is a reason why there are treatises like California Jurisprudence and Witkin, etc.: to get lawyers up to speed on what the law is in California.  Oh, and lawyers have clerks too.  Have them do the research if you can’t pick up a state-specific treatise and read it.

All of this doesn’t deflect another concern that the NCBE probably has self-interested motives for advocating a national bar exam, but in standard law school fashion, let’s balance the harm versus the utility of such a thing and see what the less onerous result is.  For the sake of moving things along I’ll wrap this up by just saying I stand for a nationalized exam.  It makes more sense than each state deciding how much of a barrier they want to throw up in front of capable law students who successfully navigated law school.  I wish the NCBE the best; their fight will take years to see some fruition.  (There is another obverse to my pro-national exam: the national exam being harder than the state exam that got replaced; and also the national exam being a complete exercise in ineptitude so that anyone with a functioning brain stem could pass it, but those are blog posts for another time.)

——

Give Teachers More Money

From Adjunct Law Prof Blog, it was reported that some website with a snappy name went and listed the best undergraduate majors by salary.  Naturally, the social sciences had some of the lousiest starting pay.  Speaking as a history major, however, I can tell you that you MUST pick what you love or your undergrad years are going to D-R-A-G.  Nothing drains the spirit by being locked in abysmal classes whose subject matter you cannot stand.  (I was a former computer science major.  Pure hell, I tell you.  So glad I finally saw the light.)

One thing I keep shaking my head is at lousy starting and mid-career pay scales for teachers.  These people deserve the big bucks because they shape the minds of our children, and yet we pay them like they were lowly DMV clerks.  The Adjunct Law Prof says: “[I]t has been known for some time that teachers are not paid the best.  Therefore, very few students go into teaching for the money.  That is how it should be.”  Yeah, but I believe the harder you work the more you should benefit from it, even if teachers already benefit from the satisfaction of expanding young minds.  This is particularly true in a profession where the school administration is automatically antagonistic towards you and will always throw you under the bus when parents complain or threaten legal action.  It makes me think of the people I know in law school who would have stayed in the teaching profession but for the horrible working environment, long hours, stress and low pay for doing something they originally loved but came to hate.  Giving teachers an extra 20K a year is a decent start, I think.

Also from Adjunct:

1. Lawyers talk too much.
2. Students from lower tiered schools are much happier workers.

—–

A New (Approach To) Law School

Last, and certainly not least, there is good friend Brian Baker @ Life on the Outskirts, whose article The Window for New ABA Law Schools is Closing Fast is very interesting.  Mr. Baker premises, inter alia, that the legal education system is changing, personified by the newly established UC Irvine School of Law:

[Dean Irwin Chemerinsky states:] “If we just replicate other law schools, UCI will fail in its unique opportunity to create an ideal law school.” So, what is his plan? Simple, “starting with its first year, when law students will be introduced to the practical tools of their profession through a lawyering-skills class that integrates clinical experience. Then, in their second year, students will work through simulated fact situations, honing their skills in a particular field of civil or criminal law, so that when they are ready to register for a third-year, semester-long clinical course, they will already have a working knowledge of how to represent clients.”

In addition, Dean Chemerinsky plans to introduce inter-disciplinary education into doctrinal courses. For example, the Dean states. “[i]f you’re going to do business or tax law,” he argues, “you’re going to need to know some economics. If you’re going to do criminal law, you need to know some psychology. If you’re going to do patent law, you need to know some engineering. And if you’re going to do environmental law, you need some environmental science.”

This, my friends, is the future of legal education. Not many schools can afford to do it at the tuition levels they charge now. Not many schools will be able to do it with the faculty they have now. This alone will close many law schools and cause many to be merged.

I’m all for the interdisciplinary approach but many law students I have spoken to have no clue what they’re going to practice in, or some, like me, had an idea of what they wanted to do but are learning that that area of the law just isn’t for them.  If I went to UCI, I would hate to think that all my psychology courses were a waste of time once I realized that criminal law was the absolute last thing on this Earth I wanted to do.  However, my argument is premised on the idea that UCI’s interdisciplinary approach means concurrent enrollment in law school courses and undergraduate courses.  Maybe what they meant was having a criminal law class with “psychology of crime” literature sprinkled into the case book (which I wonder if there are any even published).  Oh man, another thought just came to mind: you already know you hate criminal law but have to take it because its a bar course, and now here you are reading cases AND being subjected to case studies on serial killers that absolutely turn your stomach (Dr. Mengele, anyone?).  Plus, how do you fit in all the law and all the interdisciplinary into one course and still manage to get everything covered?  Imagine a contracts class that now has to include Posner’s theories of law and economics.  One of the things I liked about law school was that I no longer had to zone out to “undergrad” reading assignments that I just breezed through with little, if any, critical analysis because such things won’t help you IRAC any better.

Again, the interdisciplinary approach does sound good because I think its a creative alternative to the curriculum that’s in place now but the new system will have kinks to work out like any other.  Good luck to UCI and Dean Chemerinsky.

http://abaaccreditation.wordpress.com/2009/09/02/the-window-for-new-aba-law-schools-is-closing-fast/

NPS Announces Public Scoping Meeting Dates to discuss the Merced River Plan

Hello all,

The National Park Service has disclosed its meeting locations for public comments on the Merced River Plan.  LINK: http://www.nps.gov/yose/parkmgmt/mrpworkshops.htm

Public Scoping Meeting Schedule
All times 4–8 p.m., except the Yosemite Valley Open Houses

Date	Location	Address
Mon., Oct. 26	Masonic Lodge	Hwy 49, Oakhurst
Tues., Oct. 27	Mono Basin Visitor Center	Mono Basin Visitor Center, Lee Vining
Wed., Oct. 28	Yosemite Valley	Auditorium—Open House (1–4 p.m.)
Mon., Nov. 2	Mariposa Government Center	5100 Bullion St., Mariposa, CA 95338 (2nd Floor)
Tues., Nov. 3	Fresno REI	7810 N. Blackstone Ave. Fresno, CA 93720
Wed., Nov. 4	Groveland	Groveland Community Hall
Mon., Nov. 9	Sacramento Southside Clubhouse	2051 6th Street, Sacramento, CA 95814
Tues., Nov. 10	Doubletree Conference Center at Berkeley Marina	Doubletree Hotel & Executive Meeting Center Berkeley-Marina 200 Marina Blvd., Berkeley CA 94710
Mon., Nov. 16	LA River Center	570 West Avenue 26, L.A.
Wed., Dec. 2	Yosemite Valley	Auditorium—Open House (1–4 p.m.)